

# Fixing Boghossian on the Epistemology of the Analytic

November 12, 2010

## Abstract

Do sentences like, ‘all bachelors are unmarried’, which have been traditionally classed as analytic, have a special epistemic status? Quine famously argued that they don’t, but in a 1996 paper Paul Boghossian proposed a distinctive epistemology for such sentences. In this paper I propose a substantially revised version of this epistemology, which avoids a number of criticisms which have been leveled against Boghossian’s proposal in the literature. My proposal combines Quinean and Millian revision with appeals to Davidsonian charitable interpretation.

## 1 Introduction

Sixty years after Quine’s Two Dogmas<sup>1</sup>, it is not too controversial that we can draw *some* distinction between analytic and synthetic claims. But it remains a controversial question whether the kinds of sentences that are typically called analytic share some kind of distinctive epistemology, or other philosophically interesting feature.

In *Analyticity Reconsidered*<sup>2</sup>, Paul Boghossian proposed an account of how these sentences might, indeed, have a special epistemic status. On his view, analytic claims are special in that we can learn them ‘merely in virtue of our understanding of language’, by deriving them as follows:

- (P1) If “bachelor” is to mean what it does, then “All bachelors are unmarried.” expresses a truth.
- (P2) “bachelor” means what it does.
- Therefore “All bachelors are unmarried.” expresses a truth.

But, this account immediately raises some questions: how can we learn the premises (P1) and (P2)? And in what sense are these premises learned ‘merely

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<sup>1</sup>The Philosophical Review 60 (1951): 20-43

<sup>2</sup>Nous August 1996

in virtue of our competence with language?’ Indeed, some serious objections have been raised in the literature.

In this essay, I will suggest a middle route which aims to fix the problems for Boghossian’s view, while preserving the intuitive feeling that appeals to analyticity can serve some epistemic role (e.g. “How do I know that murder is wrong? Well, that’s just part of what I mean by the word “murder”. Perhaps you mean to ask, how I know that this particular instance of killing is wrong? ”) My proposed account of analytic knowledge begins with a notion of what it is for a sentence to feel analytically obvious, and then combines a substantive story about reliability of these feelings with a trivial one about justification.

The story about reliability explains why sentences that *feel* analytically obvious to people will tend to be ones that *actually express truths* by appealing to a *combination* of relevant meta-semantic fact and Quinean processes of theory revision. The mere fact that a sentence feels analytically obvious to people in a community, can actually make it more likely that this sentence *will count as expressing a truth* in that language. But general processes of revision steer us away from accepting (much less finding analytically obvious) the kind of bad tonk-like combinations of sentences and inference dispositions which are beyond the powers of charitable interpretation to salvage.

The simplest (internalist) version of the story about justification then says that people have prima facie warrant to assert and believe whatever feels analytically obvious to them in this way, and to derive whatever consequences feel analytically obvious to them, although this warrant can be easily defeated in various ways. [See 6.3 for a less radically internalist variant.] An externalist variant of the story about justification says that people have prima facie warrant to assert and believe whatever propositions with entirely true Stalnacker-diagonals feel analytically obvious to them.

## 2 Problems for Boghossian

Firstly, Timothy Williamson objects that a philosopher with suitably perverse views on logic, might understand all the relevant words perfectly well, while denying that paradigmatically analytic sentences like “All vixens are vixens.” express a truth. For example, a philosopher might hold the deviant opinion that claims about “All Fs” can only be true if there is at least one F, and also believe some conspiracy theory about vixens having (unknown to most of the world) gone extinct.<sup>3</sup> Hence, ‘mere understanding of language’ can’t be enough to ensure assent to claims like (P1).

Secondly, Carrie Jenkins, a recent advocate of Boghossian’s approach, considers it a serious open research project to say how the “concept inspection” which is supposed to give us knowledge of claims like (P1) could work<sup>4</sup>.

<sup>3</sup>Timothy Williamson (2007) *Philosophy of Philosophy*, Blackwell

<sup>4</sup>Carrie Jenkins (2009) *Grounding Concepts: An Empirical Basis for Arithmetic Knowledge*, Oxford University Press

Thirdly, various people have pointed out that acquiring a combination of putatively meaning-fixing stipulations which genuinely correspond to a meaningful word (rather than merely expressing an incoherent jumble like the inference rules for Prior's defective connective 'tonk'<sup>5</sup>), is not a trivial task. So, there's a serious question about how we can learn statements like (P2), which seem to entail substantive mathematical consistency statements (e.g. that "0=1" cannot be derived from any of the claims which, like (P1), must be true if "bachelor" is to mean anything).

### 3 Analytic obviousness: defining some terms

I will say

*A sentence<sup>6</sup> S feels analytically obvious for a subject P, iff P feels brutally entitled to assert that S is a necessary truth<sup>7</sup>, despite not being able to give any justification beyond the (philosophically mysterious) claim that the truth of S is 'just part of what [some relevant word in S] means'.*

*An inference feels analytically obvious to P, iff P feels brutally entitled to make the inference (and takes this inference to be necessarily truth preserving) despite not having to give any justification for it beyond, perhaps, the claim above, that the truth of S is 'just part of what [some relevant word in S] the word means'.*

*A sentence S feels analytic for P, iff O can be derived from premises that feel analytically obvious, via inferences that feel analytically obvious.<sup>8</sup>*

Note that feeling X analytically obvious (as defined above) is different from just feeling obvious to a very high degree, in two ways. Firstly there's the matter of justification. It may seem extremely obvious to me that grass is green, or rocks are inedible, but there are plenty of things which I'd be inclined to say or show to people to back up this claim. In contrast, some traditionally analytic statements (there is extra terrestrial life or there is not extra terrestrial life,  $1=1$ , prime numbers are divisible only by themselves and 1) have the feature that we are happy to accept them, while being unable to supply any kind of argument or experiment by way of further justification. Secondly there's the matter of necessity. I feel inclined to assert that P: 'It's not the case that the whole world around me is composed of pea soup which just forms up into suitable objects whenever I walk by.' without needing to give any further justification for this claim. But this claim is not a necessary truth, so P does not count as feeling analytically obvious to me, by the definition above.

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<sup>5</sup>'tonk' is a connective which has the introduction rules for 'or' but the elimination rules for 'and', so that using it allows you to infer any sentence from any other one

<sup>6</sup>For reasons of clarity and concision I will only be considering sentences with no obvious element of indexicality or context-dependence in what follows. So by 'sentence' in this definition and those to come, I strictly mean something like 'eternal sentence'.

<sup>7</sup>Or perhaps that S has an entirely true Stalnacker diagonal, see below.

<sup>8</sup>If you do not feel that short logical inferences are analytically obvious, read this definition as allowing for both inferences that feel analytically obvious and logical inferences.

We should also note that feeling S is analytically obvious doesn't require being absolutely unwilling to revise S. For example, it might feel analytically obvious to a person that a) 0 grains of sand is a heap b) a million grains of sand isn't a heap and c) removing one grain can't change a heap into a non-heap. And yet, this person could easily be persuaded to deny one of these statements, by pointing out the way that these three claims they want to accept are incompatible with one another.

## 4 The Meta-semantic Mechanism

Now that we have this grip on what it means for a sentence to feel analytically obvious to a person, let us turn to the question of how these feeling could have come to be remotely reliable.

### 4.1 Analytic obviousness and ideal interpretation

Like Boghossian I propose to appeal to meta-semantic facts, about how our use of a word helps determine its meaning. But, rather than saying that the analytic sentences are a class of sentences which a) are accepted by everyone who counts as knowing the words in that sentence, and b) are bound to express a truth, if the words in that language are meaningful, I propose we take a less demanding, Davidson-inspired view of the relationship between individual use and meaning.

This kind of view is commonly expressed using the metaphor of an ideal interpreter. An ideal interpreter knows all the descriptive facts about the world, and has godlike powers of mathematical and logical reasoning. They also understand English words like "mean" or "assert" and "believe", or similar words in some other language. We can then express about the meaning of a person's words supervenes on descriptive facts about their use of language, environment, community etc. more picturesquely and efficiently- as claims about how the ideal interpreter would make their interpretative decisions. So, for example, we might say that this ideal interpreter would interpret so as to maximize the number of true beliefs a subject comes out as having, or the extent to which the subject's beliefs are justified, while also trying to satisfy other desiderata like simplicity constraints. The former idea (that the interpreter would try to maximize truth or justification) is sometimes called the principle of charity.

The cash value of these metaphorical claims, is a constraint on what beliefs it is possible to have, and which descriptive scenarios would count as believing what. For I take it to be uncontroversial that intentional facts supervene on descriptive facts; you can't have a difference in beliefs without some descriptive difference in behavior/brain state/experiences/external environment. And the interpreter knows all these descriptive facts and has godlike ideal powers of reasoning about what these facts require. So, if there's no physically possible scenario which an ideal interpreter would *interpret* you as

e.g. being so massively wrong that you believe all the things about cats which would actually be true to say about dogs, then it is not possible to *be* in this belief state.

Now, I want to propose that **among the constraints which an ideal interpreter would aim to satisfy, is the requirement that as many as possible of the sentences which feel analytically obvious to the subject being interpreted should come out to express truths**. The cash value of that is this: it's harder to be wrong about sentences that feel analytically obvious to you, than it is to be wrong about sentences which feel obvious but not analytically obvious.

## 4.2 A motivating example

To motivate this claim consider the following case. As per Hume's method of difference we want to think of a where feelings of analytic obviousness vary, while other relevant descriptive facts remain the same, and then see whether this difference in feelings of analytic obviousness really makes a difference to meaning attribution. Does the mere fact of a person's feeling a sentence is analytically obvious make that sentence more likely to express a truth in their idiolect, as I have claimed? So, here's the case. Consider two aspects of our ordinary use of the word "addition": deployment of the recursive definition of addition " $x + 0 = x$  and  $x + s(n) = s(x+n)$ ", and the gradeschool algorithms you learned for calculating, say,  $12+7$ . Now, imagine a pair of people, Alice and Bob, whose use of the word "multiplication" challenges the ideal interpreter's charity as follows.

Alice and Bob each find the ordinary recursive definition for 'addition' obvious, but also find it equally obvious that the grade school algorithm that actually calculates the *addition* can be used to do "addition". So if asked to "add 2 and 5 using the recursive algorithm" they both get "10", but if asked "add 2 and 5 directly" they both get 7. Each belongs to an isolated society in which their responses are the norm, and shared by all experts. However:

Alice finds the the recursive definition analytically obvious i.e. she won't cite anything else to justify it, beyond talk about the meanings of words. In contrast, she finds the grade-school algorithm equally obvious, but she is disposed cite other things (like the recursive definition) in an attempt to justify it. (Of course, if she every actually does work through the recursive algorithm for addition in support of some conclusion arrived at via the gradeschool algorithm for multiplication, he would be in for a surprise)

Bob, in contrast, finds the the grade-school algorithm analytically obvious i.e. he won't cite anything else to justify it, beyond talk about the meanings of words. In contrast, he finds the recursive definition equally obvious, but he is disposed to cite other things (like the grade-school algorithm) in an attempt to justify it.

I submit that Alice counts as meaning addition by "addition", whereas Bob counts as meaning multiplication by "addition".

Thus, it would seem, the mere fact that you find some proposition/inference method to be analytically obvious vs. obvious can actually make it more likely

that that sentence in question expresses a truth in your idiolect. And this means that we can back up the previous section's hyper-internalist claim that sentences which feel analytically obvious to a subject, are *prima facie* warranted for him, with the externalist fact that such sentences are, in fact, particularly likely to express truths in his language!<sup>9</sup>

### 4.3 The Vixen Objection

We are now in a position to block the first of the three objections which we started with - Williamson's point that it's not unintelligible for someone to deny even paradigmatically analytic claims, while still understanding the words in question. For, our proposal is just that finding a certain claim about "sums" analytically obvious makes it more likely that that that claim will express a truth in your idiolect. And this in no way entails the further idea that everyone who counts as meaning the same thing as you do by "sums" must accept this particular claim. There can be (and presumably are) many different claims such that finding them analytically obvious would count in favor of your meaning sum by "sum" (e.g. 'the sum of 7 and 5 is 12'), although one might intelligibly still mean "sum" while denying this claim.

## 5 The Belief-Revision Mechanism

However, we aren't done yet. We still have the worry about 'tonk' to address. How do we manage to avoid accepting inconsistent statements as analytic truths - or at least avoid it frequently enough that the process of believing whatever feels analytically obvious to you isn't wildly unreliable? The meta-semantic concerns of the previous section aren't enough to do the job. For, however charitable our ideal interpreter is, he can't do much for someone who is disposed to make the inferences characteristic of 'tonk'! Here's where we bring in a second ingredient - causal (though this is not to say empirical) interaction with the world.

### 5.1 Tonk and belief revision

The explanation I want to propose appeals to something like Quinean revision to explain how we manage to avoid finding bad tonk-like patterns of inference obvious and compelling. We start by noticing how analytic-feeling reasoning is 'plugged in' to our practical decisions and behavior, in the sense that going through chains of analytically-obvious-feeling reasoning can have a systematic

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<sup>9</sup>I'd like to quickly note at this point that my claim also follows from Williamson-style versions of interpretivism on which the principle of charity requires us to maximize a sum of things which includes epistemic rationality (though I don't mean to commit to any such view). For, if someone feels completely untroubled by their inability to justify S beyond saying things about the meanings of their words (as is one does when something feels analytically obvious), this behavior will appear very irrational, unless S does indeed express a truth in their language.

effect on what actions a person will perform. For example, if you stop someone who is going through a chain of analytically-obvious-feeling reasoning while playing a strategy game, or designing a bridge mid-reasoning, and give them a fake memory of what sentences they previously arrived at (or, if you want to economize, just sneakily erase and rewrite their notes on paper), this is likely to change what they will do, (generally in a way that has a bad results). Think of these connections between analytic-feeling-reasoning and behavior as the way that a subject is inclined to use their analytic-feeling reasoning.

This helps solve the tonk problem, because considering these patterns of behavior, we can note that the pattern of inferences characteristic of 'tonk' is poisonous to the success of any of these projects. Were you to accept the introduction and elimination rules for the word 'tonk', (and to accept any other one sentence in your language), you could easily be prompted to accept any other sentence, and hence if you kept the usual connections between analytic-feeling-reasoning and behavior in place, take the actions associated with these sentences. If tonk inferences came to seem obvious to you (and kept seeming obvious to you after the first few times that you derived that the sky was pink, or crocodiles were pacifists) the practical consequences would be dire. And the same thing goes, if you were to accept any combination of syntactically inconsistent claims, together with the usual *ex nihilo quod libit* of classical logic. Finding inconsistent patterns of reasoning analytically obvious leads to bad behavior at the chessboard, and the engineer's drawing board and in many other places as well.

Given this connection between expectations and behavior, it's not surprising that nature hasn't made us inclined to persevere in the face of logical explosion of apparent analytic truths. As we see in the case of the Sorites paradox, when faced with unexpected consequences of apparently analytic reasoning, which (when combined with our usual methods of application, and the rest of our beliefs) leads to conflict with experience, we are perfectly willing to revise our beliefs. Similarly, when certain deeply entrenched applications of analytic feeling reasoning fail to match with suitable experience (e.g. a priori reasoning about the structure space pre-einstein, fails to match with experiments with light, or the fallacious reasoning about probability which says you shouldn't switch doors in the Monty Haul problem fails to match with the results of millions of runs of a computer simulation) we are willing to revise our beliefs.

## 5.2 Contrast with Quine

According to the story advocated here, there's a sense in which Quine was right, about the revisability of apparently a priori obvious truths, in response to recalcitrant experience. However, there's also an important sense in which Quine was wrong, and we should also note that this theory doesn't commit us to any of the unattractive epistemic and scientific consequences attached to his theory. For, note that saying that experience causally prompts revision of those patterns of analytic feeling reasoning which are beyond Davidsonian charity, does not commit one to saying that experience justifies the resulting

beliefs. On the view advocated here, one has antecedent warrant for believing whatever feels analytically obvious, and all recalcitrant experience can do is defeat this warrant. And, indeed, this seems a much more natural thing to say, than the Quinean conclusion that experience figures in the justification of these beliefs - when we consider the kind of encounters with experience that can prompt revision. Think about Frege's rejection of Basic Law 5. This was clearly causally prompted by experience; if he had received Russell's letter a day later, he would have believed Basic Law 5 a day longer. Before seeing Russell's letter, he would have predicted that he was good at recognizing inscriptions of proofs in his formal system, and his system was consistent, so he would never see what looks like a formal proof of inconsistency in his system, then he had the surprising experience of seeing just that, and this causally prompted him to revise. Nonetheless, he certainly would not have said that the experience of seeing the letter on a piece of paper in front of him, was what justified the change in his theory. Rather, he would have said that he was unjustified all along in accepting that reasoning. And the same thing would seem to apply to the other large-scale revisions of apparently analytically obvious claims

Thus, what emerges is a distinctively un-Quinean picture of how these revisions work. Revision to statements which are analytically-obvious feeling, is like ordinary scientific revision, with Stockholm Syndrome. In both cases, recalcitrant experience causally prompts revision. But, in the scientific case, we often say that our initial non-experience matching beliefs were justified (though false). Whereas, when the sentences in question were ones that felt analytically obvious to us, we say that we should have known all along, we should never have accepted these sentences in the first place!

Also, note that there are relatively few applications which we are confident enough of, to motivate revising apparently analytically obvious feeling claims. For example, we expect arithmetical facts about sums to match up with logical facts about the number of F-or-Gs when there are  $n$  Fs and  $m$  Gs, and for these facts to match up with the results of various kinds of counting procedures. And (it seems to me) that if faced with a conflict between our logical intuitions and our arithmetical ones we would be willing to revise our beliefs about arithmetic. But the case is quite different with regard to using arithmetic to predict the result of various physical procedures for counting objects, or using arithmetic as part of some larger explicit scientific theory. Here, we would almost always react by giving up on the physical application (e.g. the physical procedure for counting objects) instead. It would take a very stealthy, simultaneous, change in the results of counting procedures of many different kinds, to have a chance of getting us to revise way we calculate sums (rather than just giving up the particular counting procedures that failed to match these calculations).

This is significant, because it gives a nice explanation for why these revisions of apparent analyticities should be so relatively infrequent, in comparison to scientific revisions. Most applications of math, say in physics, are well described by the positivist idea, that we see some physical phenomenon, and then empirically determine what (if any) bridge laws, connecting some portion of mathematics to the this phenomenon, to accept. Such applications fail

all the time, and all this leads us to do is change our bridge laws. In contrast, a few core applications, like the application of arithmetic to the claim that when there are 2 apples and 2 oranges there are 4 fruit - and thence (in combination with our other beliefs) to predictions about the empirical results of counting procedures - don't fit this model at all well. If facts about arithmetic failed to fit with apparent logical facts about how many fruit  $n$  apples and  $m$  oranges make, who knows what we would do! We certainly wouldn't just cheerfully revise our bridge laws, or change our logic. With regard to these limited applications (e.g. of arithmetic to logic) it's plausible that causal interaction could have produced a correct fit between these two theories long ago. So it's not surprising that we seldom revise our arithmetical beliefs about sums to match newly arrived at logical truths, (or to make any other such special core application work) for the same reason that it's not surprising that we don't often revise our basic biological theories about whether rocks are edible, or the life-cycle of cows. These subjects aren't too hard to get a theory about which gets things right (and hence matches all future experience). At some point in prehistory, we did get a theory which got things right, and now we find no occasion to tamper with what's already a success.

## 6 Justification

Finally, let us turn to the topic of justification, and a natural worry one might have about the story just given.

### 6.1 An odd consequence

It's an admittedly odd consequence of the proposal above that it turns out to be possible to have prima facie warrant for almost any proposition. For, imagine a person who finds all the kinds of propositions about arithmetic that we do analytically obvious, but also some other proposition - say the claim that there are 9 planets, equally epistemically obvious. Plausibly (if such deviance is rare enough), a person like this is best interpreted as meaning the same things as ordinary english speakers do by their numerical vocabulary. And the theory here presented would count such a person as having just as much prima facie warrant for believing this, as they have for believing any of the other claims, e.g. when there are 9 planets, and 3 moons, there are at least 12 celestial bodies.

Even worse, this kind of liberality about prima facie warrant threatens to destroy major epistemic distinctions. For example, surely we want to say that the pair of propositions P1 'There are two apples in the bowl' P2 'There are two oranges in the bowl' justifies the conclusion C 'There are at least 4 fruit in the bowl', whereas the single proposition P1, on its own, does not justify C on its own. But, surely it's psychologically possible that both of these inferences could feel equally compelling to a given subject, and (as Williamson emphasized) just one deviant judgment doesn't suffice to change the reference of someone's words.

Now, one thing to note is that often that the prima facie warrant for accepting such deviant judgements will not translate into justification-full-stop for believing that P, because the speaker's other, non-deviant judgments would conflict with them. In some cases the proposition itself will not cohere (as above). In other cases, the sentence itself might perfectly cohere with the rest of your beliefs, but other propositions which go along with finding something analytically obvious (e.g. when you feel that P is analytically obvious, you often feel that P expresses a necessary truth) might not. So, for example, if I deviantly came to feel that the proposition 'there are buildings' is analytically obvious, my warrant for believing this might be defeated by my other beliefs to the effect that a world without buildings is metaphysically possible, which put pressure on the former belief that there are buildings indirectly, via its association with the belief that it's a necessary truth that there are buildings.

However, Williamson's example of philosophers' disagreement over whether all vixens are vixens, makes it plausible that some deviant intuitions can cohere just as well with our general intuitions as many non-deviant intuitions which we intuitively want to say are justified.

## 6.2 Internalist Response

The internalist view suggested above, would simply accept that people with such deviant but coherent feelings of analytic obviousness are justified (though likely wrong) in believing what they do. You have default warrant for believing what feels analytically obvious. Most of what feels obvious will be correct, and most of your warrant for believing what's incorrect will be defeated by your acceptance of other correct, and conflicting beliefs (and inference method). But, should some such prima facie warrant slip through undefeated, you can indeed be a priori justified in believing falsehoods, or in making inferences that are not truth-preserving.

Here, my internalist is threatened with having to admit that, what seems like a completely obvious truth 'thinking there are 2 apples in the basket doesn't justify thinking there are 4 fruit in the basket', might actually be false - depending on how all kinds of meta-semantic subtleties (how deviant can someone's feelings of analytic obviousness could be, while they would still count as talking about numbers and fruit?) work out. However, there is a perfectly viable response - to simply reject the strong the connection between propositional justification and person justification, which is being used here. Must the assumption 'there are 2 apples in the basket, therefore there are 4 fruit' count as justified, simply because someone with suitably minor deviant intuitions could be a priori justified in making it?<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup>Of course, this brings up a significant open question - what IS the relationship between individual justification in accepting proposition, and relationships of justification between sets of propositions? - which I won't try to answer here.

### 6.3 Externalist Variant

Note in the above, that these worries about about justification, don't come from the account I have proposed for how get access to analytic truths. Rather, they are generated immediately by the claim that propositions which feel equally analytically obvious must be equally *prima facie* warranted, plus the Williamsonian point that people can have deviant judgments in almost any area, but while still meaning the same thing as we do by their words.

Thus, if you don't accept the internalist principle just mentioned, you can simply replace the claim that one is justified in believing everything that feels analytically obvious, with something more restrictive. An externalist version of my account could keep exactly the same naturalistic account of how our feelings of analytic obviousness came to be reliable, but say that one has default warrant for believing those specially-obvious-feeling propositions which are both true and analytic, in the philosophical-presumption-less sense of analyticity, argued for by X and Y, and alluded to at the beginning of this article.

Or, if you want a more principled distinction, you might say that we are only justified in accepting analytically-obvious feeling sentences, whose Stalnaker-diagonals are true at all sufficiently close possible worlds. (Recall that the Stalnaker-diagonal of an utterance S is true at a given world w iff, S would express a truth at W). This fits nicely with the idea, currently rising in popularity, that we have default warrant to assume certain the falsehood of certain contingent scientific statements, like 'bread will appear to nourish people up until next tuesday, at which point it will start poisoning people, with no other apparent changes' or 'the world came into being with massive apparent archeological and memory traces as if of being much older' will cash out 'in all sufficiently close possible worlds' in the ordinary way.

## 7 Conclusion

In this paper, I have proposed a way of fixing up Boghossian's account of analyticity. This proposal addresses criticisms in the literature by toning down - though not abolishing- the special epistemic status of analytic claims. It combines naturalistic mechanisms familiar from Quine and Mill, with some fairly mainstream ideas about the relationship between use and meaning, and interpretive charity, to explain why our feelings of analytic obviousness should come to be reliably correlated with truth. And, this naturalistic story of how we get reliable judgements, can then be supplemented with either an internalist or an externalist doctrine about when the beliefs in question to count as justified. Thus, perhaps, it has all the benefits which positivists had traditionally hoped to obtain from claims about analyticity (you can explain how someone knows something a priori without positing any kind of occult faculty), while avoiding the myriad problems that have been pointed out for such accounts, by Boghossian and his opponents.